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Abstract—We consider compound multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) wiretap channels where minimal channel state infor-
mation at the transmitter (CSIT) is assumed. Code construction
is given for the special case of isotropic mutual information,
which serves as a conservative strategy for general cases. Using
the flatness factor for MIMO channels, we propose lattice codes
universally achieving the secrecy capacity of compound MIMO
wiretap channels up to a constant gap (measured in nats) that
is equal to the number of transmit antennas. The proposed
approach improves upon existing works on secrecy coding for
MIMO wiretap channels from an error probability perspective,
and establishes information theoretic security (in fact semantic
security). We also give an algebraic construction to reduce the
code design complexity, as well as the decoding complexity of the
legitimate receiver. Thanks to the algebraic structures of number
fields and division algebras, our code construction for compound
MIMO wiretap channels can be reduced to that for Gaussian
wiretap channels, up to some additional gap to secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the open nature of the wireless medium, wireless
communications are inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping
attacks. Information theoretic security offers additional pro-
tection for wireless data, since it only relies on the physical
properties of wireless channels, thus representing a compet-
itive/complementary approach to security compared to tradi-
tional cryptography.
The fundamental wiretap channel model was first introduced
by Wyner [1]. In this seminal paper, Wyner defined the secrecy
capacity and presented the idea of coset coding to encode both
data and random bits to mitigate eavesdropping. In recent
years, the quest for the secrecy capacity of many classes
of channels has been one of the central topics in wireless
communications [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].
In the information theory community, a commonly used
secrecy notion is strong secrecy: the mutual information
I(M ;ZT ) between the confidential message M and the chan-
nel output ZT should vanish when the code length T → ∞.
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This common assumption of uniformly distributed messages
was relaxed in [9], which considered the concept of semantic
security: for any message distribution, the advantage obtained
by an eavesdropper from its received signal vanishes for large
block lengths. This notion is motivated by the fact that the
plaintext can be fixed and arbitrary.
For the Gaussian wiretap channel, [10] introduced the
secrecy gain of lattice codes while [11] proposed semantically
secure lattice codes based on the lattice Gaussian distribution.
To obtain semantic security, the flatness factor of a lattice was
introduced in [11] as a fundamental criterion which implies
that conditional outputs are indistinguishable for different
input messages. Using a random coding argument, it was
shown that there exist families of lattice codes which are good
for secrecy, meaning that their flatness factor vanishes. Such
families achieve semantic security for rates up to 1/2 nat from
the secrecy capacity.
Compared to the Gaussian wiretap channel, the cases of
fading and multi-input multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channels
are more technically challenging. The fundamental limits of
fading wireless channels with secrecy constraints have been
investigated in [12], [13], [2], where the achievable rates
and the secrecy outage probability were given. The secrecy
capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel was derived in [14],
[15], [16], [17], assuming full channel state information at
the transmitter (CSIT). A code design in this setting was
given in [18] by reducing to scalar Gaussian codes. Although
CSIT is sometimes available for the legitimate channel, it is
hardly possible that it would be available for the eavesdropping
channel. An achievability result was given in [19] for varying
MIMO wiretap channels with no CSI about the wiretapper,
under the condition that the wiretapper has less antennas than
the legitimate receiver. Schaefer and Loyka [20] studied the
secrecy capacity of the compound MIMO wiretap channel,
where a transmitter has no knowledge of the realization
of the eavesdropping channel, except that it remains fixed
during the transmission block and belongs to a given set
(the compound set). The compound model represents a well-
accepted reasonable approach to information theoretic security,
which assumes minimal CSIT of the eavesdropping channel
[21], [22], [23]. It can also model a multicast channel with
several eavesdroppers, where the transmitter sends information
to all legitimate receivers while keeping it secret from all
eavesdroppers [21].
When it comes to code design for fading and MIMO wiretap
channels, an error probability criterion was used in several
prior works [24], [25], [26], while information theoretic se-
curity was only addressed recently with the help of flatness
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2factors [27], [28]. In particular, [28] established strong secrecy
over MIMO wiretap channels for secrecy rates that are within
a constant gap from the secrecy capacity.
A. Main Contributions
In this paper, we propose universal codes for compound
Gaussian MIMO wiretap channels that complement the recent
work reported in [28]. The key method is discrete Gaussian
shaping and a “direct” proof of the universal flatness of the
eavesdropper’s lattice. This method is similar to that used in
[29] to approach the capacity of compound MIMO channels
so that the present paper can be considered a companion
paper of [29] for wiretap channels. Note that [28] used an
“indirect” proof, which was based on an upper bound on the
smoothing parameter in terms of the minimum distance of
the dual lattice. Besides considering different channel models
([28] is focused on ergodic stationary channels although it also
briefly addresses compound channels), the code constructions
of this paper and [28] are also different: the construction of
[28] is based on a particular sequence of algebraic number
fields with increasing degrees, while the algebraic construction
of this work combines algebraic number fields of fixed degree
and random error correcting codes of increasing lengths. The
proposed construction enjoys a significantly smaller gap to
secrecy capacity, as well as lower decoding complexity, than
[28], over compound MIMO wiretap channels.
We focus on a compound channel formed by the set of
all matrices with the same white-input capacity (see (3) for
the precise model). Our lattice coding scheme universally
achieves rates (in nats) up to (Cb − Ce − na)+, where Cb
is the capacity of the legitimate channel, Ce is the capacity
of the eavesdropper channel, na is the number of transmit
antennas and (x)+ = max {x, 0}. We believe the na-nat gap
is an artifact of our proof technique based on the flatness
factor, which may be removed by improving the flatness-factor
method. This is left as an open problem for future research.
For this special compound model, we also show how to
extend the analysis in order to accommodate number-of-
antenna mismatch, i.e., security is valid regardless of the
number of antennas at the eavesdropper1. This is a very
appealing property, since the number of receive antennas of
an eavesdropper may be unknown to the transmitter.
We present two techniques to prove universality of the
proposed lattice codes. The first technique is based on Con-
struction A (see Sect. V-A for the definition) and the usual
argument for compound channels [30], [31], which combines
fine quantization of the channel space with mismatch encod-
ing for quantized states. This method is a generic proof of
the existence of good codes which potentially incurs large
blocklengths and performance loss. The second technique is
based on algebraic lattices and assumes that the codes admit
an “algebraic reduction” and can absorb the channel state. In
fact, any code which is good for the Gaussian wiretap channel
can be coupled with this second technique, as long as it also
possesses an additional algebraic structure (for precise terms
1Previous works [24], [28] required that the number of the eavesdropper’s
antennas be greater than or equal to na.
see Definition 6). It is inspired by previous works on algebraic
reduction for fading and MIMO channels [32], [33], which are
revisited here in terms of secrecy.
B. Relation to Previous Works
An idea of approaching the secrecy capacity of fading
wiretap channels using nested lattice codes was outlined in
[34]. Code construction for compound wiretap channels has
been further developed in [35], which leads to the current
work where proof details are given.
The technique for establishing universality of the codes in
[20] over the compound MIMO channel with (uncountably)
infinite uncertainty sets consists of quantizing the channel
space and designing a (random Gaussian) codebook for the
quantized channels. This method is similar to the proof of
Theorem 1 in the present paper.
Compound MIMO channels without secrecy constraints
have been considered earlier in [30], [31], [36] for random
codebooks. Lattice codes are shown to achieve the optimal
diversity-multiplexing tradeoff for MIMO channels in [37].
More recently it was proven that precoded integer forcing
[38] achieves the compound capacity up to a gap, while
algebraic lattice codes [29] achieve the compound capacity
with ML decoding and a gap to the compound capacity
of MIMO channels with reduced decoding complexity. As
mentioned above, some techniques (generalized Construction
A and channel quantization) of this paper are similar to those
used in [29].
C. Organization
The technical content of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II we discuss the main problem and notions of secu-
rity. In Section III, we introduce the main notation on lattices
and discrete Gaussians, stating generalized versions of known
results for correlated Gaussian distributions. In Section IV we
give an overview of the main coding scheme and analyze the
information leakage and reliability. The proof of universality,
however, is postponed until Section V, where we show that
lattice codes can achieve vanishing information leakage under
semantic security through the two aforementioned techniques.
Section VI concludes the paper with a discussion of other
compound models and future work.
D. Notation
Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper and
lowercase boldface letters, respectively. For a matrix A, its
Hermitian transpose, inverse, determinant and trace are de-
noted by A†, A−1, |A| and tr(A), respectively. We denote
the Frobenius norm of a matrix by ‖A‖F ,
√
tr(A†A) and
the spectral norm (i.e., 2-norm) by ‖A‖ , √λ1, where λ1 is
the largest eigenvalue of A†A. I denotes the identity matrix.
We write A  0 for a symmetric matrix A if it is positive
semi-definite. Similarly, we write A  B if (A − B)  0.
We use the standard asymptotic notation f (x) = O (g (x))
when lim supx→∞ |f(x)|/g(x) < ∞ , f (x) = o (g (x))
when limx→∞ f(x)/g(x) = 0, f (x) = Ω (g (x)) when
3lim infx→∞ f(x)/g(x) > 0, and f (x) = ω (g (x)) when
limx→∞ f(x)/g(x) =∞. Finally, in this paper, the logarithm
is taken with respect to base e (where e is the Neper number)
and information is measured in nats.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the following wiretap model. A transmitter (Alice)
sends information through a MIMO channel to a legitimate
receiver (Bob) and is eavesdropped by an illegitimate user
(Eve). The channel equations for Bob and Eve read:
Yb︸︷︷︸
nb×T
= Hb︸︷︷︸
nb×na
X︸︷︷︸
na×T
+ Wb︸︷︷︸
nb×T
Ye︸︷︷︸
ne×T
= He︸︷︷︸
ne×na
X︸︷︷︸
na×T
+ We︸︷︷︸
ne×T
,
(1)
where na is the number of transmit antennas, nb (ne, resp.) is
the number of receive antennas for Bob (Eve, resp.), T is the
coherence time, and Wb (We, resp.) has circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian i.i.d. entries with variance σ2b (σ
2
e , resp.) per
complex dimension. We can vectorize (1) in a natural way:
yb︸︷︷︸
nbT×1
= Hb︸︷︷︸
nbT×naT
x︸︷︷︸
naT×1
+ wb︸︷︷︸
nbT×1
ye︸︷︷︸
neT×1
= He︸︷︷︸
neT×naT
x︸︷︷︸
naT×1
+ we︸︷︷︸
neT×1
,
(2)
where Hb and He are the block diagonal matrices
Hb = IT ⊗Hb =

Hb
Hb
. . .
Hb
 ,
He = IT ⊗He =

He
He
. . .
He
 .
For convenience, we denote the transmit signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) in Bob and Eve’s channels by
ρb ,
P
σ2b
and ρe ,
P
σ2e
,
respectively, where P is the power constraint, i.e., the trans-
mitted signal satisfies E[x†x] ≤ naTP .
We assume that the channel realizations (Hb,He) are
unknown to Alice but belong to a compound set S = Sb×Se ∈
Cnb×na × Cne×na . From the security perspective, we further
make the conservative assumption that Eve knows both Hb and
He. Under this general scenario the (strong) secrecy capacity
is bounded by [20]:
Cs ≥ max
R
min
Hb,He
(
log |I + σ−1b H†bHbR| − log
∣∣I + σ−1e H†eHeR∣∣)+ ,
where the minimum is over all realizations in S and the
maximum over the matrices R  0 such that tr(R) ≤ naP .
Suppose that Sb and Se are the set of channels with the same
isotropic mutual information, i.e.,
Sb =
{
Hb ∈ Cnb×na : |I + ρbH†bHb| = eCb
}
,
Se =
{
He ∈ Cne×na :
∣∣I + ρeH†eHe∣∣ = eCe} , (3)
for fixed Cb, Ce ≥ 0. In this case, the bound gives Cs ≥
(Cb − Ce)+. The worst case is achieved by taking a specific
“isotropic” realization H†bHb = αbI, H
†
eHe = αeI, where
αb and αe are such that Hb and He belong to Sb and Se,
respectively. From this we conclude that Cs = Cb − Ce. The
goal of this paper is to construct universal lattice codes that
approach the secrecy capacity Cs with semantic security. As a
corollary, the semantic security capacity and the strong secrecy
capacity of the compound set Sb × Se coincide.
A practical motivation to consider the compound model (3)
is the following. Firstly, notice that the secrecy capacity is the
same if we replace the equality in the definition of Sb and Se
with upper/lower bounds; more precisely the secrecy capacity
of the channel with compound set Se × Sb, where
Sb =
{
Hb ∈ Cnb×na : |I + ρbH†bHb| ≥ eCb
}
,
Se =
{
He ∈ Cne×na : |I + ρeH†eHe| ≤ eCe
}
,
(4)
is the same as for Se×Sb. Note that the sets Sb, Se and Se are
compact whereas Sb is not. In other words, universal codes are
robust, in the sense that only a lower bound on the legitimate
channel capacity and an upper bound on the eavesdropper
channel are needed. From the security perspective, this is
a safe strategy in the scenario where the capacities are not
known precisely. Even if Bob and Eve’s channels are random,
an acceptable secrecy-outage probability can be guaranteed by
setting Cb and Ce properly. Then, the problem still boils down
to the design of universal codes for the compound model (3).
A. Notions of Security
A secrecy code for the compound MIMO channel can be
formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. An (R,R′, T )-secrecy code for a compound
MIMO channel with set S = Sb × Se consists of
(i) A set of messages MT =
{
1, . . . , eTR
}
(the secret
message rate R is measured in nats and eTR is assumed
to be an integer for convenience).
(ii) An auxiliary (not necessarily uniform) source U taking
values in UT with entropy R′ = H(U).
(iii) A stochastic encoding function fT :MT ×UT → Cna×T
satisfying the power constraint
1
T
tr
(
E
[
fT (m,U)
†fT (m,U)]
]) ≤ naP, (5)
for any m ∈MT .
(iv) A decoding function gT : Sb×Rnb×T →MT with output
mˆ = gT (sb,Yb).
A pair (sb, se) ∈ Sb × Se is referred to as a channel state
(or channel realization). To ensure reliability for all channel
4states we require a sequence of codes whose error probability
for message M vanishes uniformly:
Perr|M , P(Mˆ 6= M)→ 0,∀sb ∈ Sb, as T →∞. (6)
Let pM be a message distribution over MT . For strong
secrecy, pM is usually assumed to be uniform; however, this
assumption is not sufficient from the viewpoint of semantic
security, which is the standard notion of security in modern
cryptography. Let Ye be the output of the channel to the eaves-
dropper, who is omniscient. The following security notions are
adapted from [9], [11] and should hold in the limit T →∞:
• Mutual Information Security (MIS): Unnormalized mu-
tual information
I(M ; Ye)→ 0 (7)
for any message distribution pM and for all se ∈ Se.
• Semantic Security (SEMANTICS): Adversary’s advantage
sup
f,pM
{
max
m′
P(f(M) = f(m′)|Ye)−max
m′′
P(f(M) = f(m′′))
}
→ 0
for any function f from M to finite sequences of bits in
{0, 1}∗, and all se ∈ Se.
• Distinguishing Security (DISTS): The maximum varia-
tional distance
max
m′,m′′∈MT
V(pYe|m′ , pYe|m′′)→ 0 for all se ∈ Se.
We stress that all three notions require a sequence of codes
to be universally secure for all channel states. Treating
these notions as classes, we have the inclusions MIS ⊆
SEMANTICS = DISTS, i.e., the sequences of codes satisfying
DISTS are the same as the ones satisfying SEMANTICS and
also include those satisfying MIS [11, Prop. 1]. Moreover, if
in the above notions we require that the convergence rate is
o(1/T ), the three sets coincide. We thus define universally
secure codes as follows.
Definition 2. A sequence of codes of rate R is universally
secure for the MIMO wiretap channel if for all (sb, se) ∈ S,
it satisfies the reliability condition (6) and mutual information
security (7) uniformly.
Then, semantic security follows as a corollary, which is a
direct consequence of established relations between MIS and
SEMANTICS [9]:
Corollary 1. The sequence of codes given in Definition 2 is
semantically secure for the compound MIMO wiretap channel.
In what follows we proceed to construct universally secure
codes for the MIMO wiretap channel using lattice coset codes.
III. CORRELATED DISCRETE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTIONS
In this subsection, we exhibit essential results and concepts
for the definition and analysis of our lattice coding scheme.
A. Preliminary Lattice Definitions
A (complex) lattice Λ with generator matrix Bc ∈ Cn×2n
is a discrete additive subgroup of Cn given by
Λ = L(Bc) =
{
Bcx : x ∈ Z2n
}
. (8)
A complex lattice has an equivalent real lattice generated by
the matrix obtained by stacking real and imaginary parts of
matrix Bc:
Br =
( <(Bc)
=(Bc)
)
∈ R2n×2n.
A fundamental region R(Λ) for Λ is any interior-disjoint
region that tiles Cn through translates by vectors of Λ. For
any y,x ∈ Cn we say that y = x (mod Λ) iff y − x ∈ Λ.
By convention, we fix a fundamental region and denote by
y (mod Λ) the unique representative x ∈ R(Λ) such that
y = x (mod Λ). The volume of Λ is defined as the volume
of a fundamental region for the equivalent real lattice, given
by V (Λ) = |Br|.
Throughout this text, for convenience, we also use the
matrix-notation of lattice points. If Λ ⊂ CnT is a full-rank lat-
tice, the matrix form representation of x = (x1, . . . , xnT ) ∈ Λ
is
X =

x1 x2 · · · xT
xT+1 xT+2 · · · x2T
x2T+1 x2T+2 · · · x3T
...
...
. . .
...
x(n−1)T+1 x(n−1)T+2 · · · xnT
 .
The dual Λ∗ of a complex lattice is defined as
Λ∗ = {x ∈ Cn : < 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z for all y ∈ Λ} .
B. The Flatness Factor
The flatness factor has been introduced in [11], and will
be used here to bound the information leakage of information
transmission of our coding scheme.
The p.d.f. of the complex Gaussian centered at c ∈ Cn is
defined as
fσ,c(x) =
1
(piσ2)n
e−(x−c)
†(x−c)/σ2 .
We write fσ,Λ(x) for the sum of fσ,c(x) over c ∈ Λ. The
flatness factor of a lattice quantifies the distance between
fσ,Λ(x) and the uniform distribution over R(Λ) and, as we
will see, bounds the amount of leaked information in a lattice
coding scheme.
Definition 3 (Flatness factor for spherical Gaussian distribu-
tions). For a lattice Λ and a parameter σ, the flatness factor
is defined by:
Λ(σ) , max
x∈R(Λ)
|V (Λ)fσ,Λ(x)− 1|
where R(Λ) is a fundamental region of Λ.
For a complex lattice Λ ⊂ Cn, let γΛ(σ) = V (Λ)
1
n
σ2 be the
volume-to-noise ratio (VNR). We recall the formulas of the
5flatness factor and smoothing parameter, adapted to complex
lattices. The flatness factor can be written as [11, Prop. 2]:
Λ(σ) =
(
γΛ(σ)
pi
)n
ΘΛ
(
1
piσ2
)
− 1 = ΘΛ∗
(
piσ2
)− 1, (9)
where ΘΛ is the theta series of the lattice Λ.
Definition 4 (Smoothing parameter [39]). For a lattice Λ
and ε > 0, the smoothing parameter is defined by the
function ηε(Λ) =
√
2piσ, for the smallest σ > 0 such that∑
λ∗∈Λ∗\{0} e
−pi2σ2‖λ∗‖2 ≤ ε.
When we have a correlated Gaussian distribution with
covariance matrix Σ
f√Σ,c(x) =
1
pin|Σ| exp
{−(x− c)TΣ−1(x− c)} , (10)
the flatness factor is similarly defined.
Definition 5 (Flatness factor for correlated Gaussian distribu-
tions).
Λ(
√
Σ) , max
x∈R(Λ)
|V (Λ)f√Σ,Λ(x)− 1|
where R(Λ) is a fundamental region of Λ.
The usual smoothing parameter in Definition 4 is a scalar.
To extend its definition to matrices, we say
√
2piΣ  ηε(Λ) if
Λ(
√
Σ) ≤ ε. This induces a partial order because Λ(
√
Σ1) ≤
Λ(
√
Σ2) if Σ1  Σ2.
When c = 0 we ignore the index and write f√Σ,0(x) =
f√Σ(x). For a covariance matrix Σ we define the generalized-
volume-to-noise ratio as
γΛ(
√
Σ) =
V (Λ)1/n
|Σ|1/n .
Clearly, the effect of correlation on the flatness factor may
be absorbed if we use a new lattice
√
Σ
σ · Λ, i.e., Λ(σ) =
√Σ
σ ·Λ
(
√
Σ). From this, and from the expression of the flatness
factor, we have
Λ(
√
Σ) =
V (Λ)
pin|Σ|
∑
λ∈Λ
e−λ
†Σ−1λ − 1
=
(
γ√Σ−1Λ(σ
2)
pi
)n
Θ√Σ−1Λ
(
1
piσ2
)
− 1.
In our applications, the matrix Σ will be determined by the
channel realization (1). Figure 1 shows the effect of fading
on the lattice Gaussian function. A function (10) which is flat
over the Gaussian channel (corresponding to Σ = I) need not
be flat for a channel in deep fading (corresponding to an ill-
conditioned Σ), in which case an eavesdropper could clearly
distinguish one dimension of the signal.
C. The Discrete Gaussian Distribution
In order to define our coding scheme, we need a last
element, which is the distribution of the sent signals. To this
end, we define the discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ+c,√Σ
(a) Σ = 0.25I
(b) Σ = 0.25diag(6, 1/6)
Fig. 1: Illustration of the periodic Gaussian function for
the lattice Z2 and different covariance matrices with same
determinant.
as the distribution assuming values on Λ + c, such that the
probability of each point λ+ c is given by
DΛ+c,√Σ(λ+ c) =
f√Σ(λ+ c)
f√Σ,Λ(c)
.
Its relation to the continuous Gaussian distribution can be
shown via the smoothing parameter or the flatness factor. For
instance, a vanishing flatness factor guarantees that the power
per dimension of DΛ+c,σI is approximately σ2 [11, Lemma
6].
The next proposition says that the sum of a continuous
Gaussian and a discrete Gaussian is approximately a contin-
uous Gaussian, provided that the flatness factor is small. The
proof can be found in [28, Appendix I-A]:
Lemma 1. Given x1 sampled from the discrete Gaussian
distribution DΛ+c,√Σ1 and x2 sampled from the continuous
Gaussian distribution f√Σ2 . Let Σ0 = Σ1 + Σ2 and let
Σ−13 = Σ
−1
1 + Σ
−1
2 . If
√
Σ3  ηε(Λ) for ε ≤ 12 , then the
distribution g of x = x1 + x2 is close to f√Σ0 :
g(x) ∈ f√Σ0(x) [1− 4ε, 1 + 4ε] .
6IV. CODING SCHEME AND ANALYSIS
A. Overview
Given a pair of nested lattices ΛTe ⊂ ΛTb ⊂ CnaT such that
1
T
log |ΛTb /ΛTe | = R,
the transmitter maps a message m to a coset of ΛTe in quotient
ΛTb /Λ
T
e , then samples a point from that coset. Concretely, one
can use a a one-to-one map φ such that φ(m) = λm, where
λm is a representative of the coset and then samples the signal
x ∼ DΛTe +λm,σs , broadcasting it to the channels. A block
diagram for the transmission until the front-end receivers Bob
and Eve is depicted in Figure 2a.
In order to find pairs of sequences of nested lattices ΛTb and
ΛTe we employ constructions of lattices from error-correcting
codes. The analysis and full construction are explained in
Section V. Essentially, the lattice ΛTb controls reliability and
has to be chosen in such a way that it is universally good for
the legitimate compound channel. The lattice ΛTe controls the
information leakage to the eavesdropper, and has to be chosen
in such a way that the flatness factor vanishes universally for
any eavesdropper realization (universally good for secrecy).
The main result of this section is the following theorem, stating
the existence of schemes with vanishing probability of error
and vanishing information leakage for all pairs of realizations
in the compound set Sb × Se.
Theorem 1. There exists a sequence of pairs of nested lattices
(ΛTb ,Λ
T
e )
∞
T=1, Λ
T
b ⊂ ΛTe ⊂ CnaT such that as T → ∞, the
lattice coding scheme universally achieves any secrecy rate
R < (Cb − Ce − na)+.
Moreover, we show that both the probability of error and
information leakage in Theorem 1 vanishes uniformly for all
realizations.
B. The Eavesdropper Channel: Security
For a fixed realization He, the key element for bounding
the information leakage is the following lemma [11, Lem 2]:
Lemma 2. Suppose that there exists a probability density func-
tion q taking values in Cne×T such that V(pYe|m, qYe) ≤ εT
for all m ∈ MT . Then, for all message distributions, the
information leakage is bounded as:
I(M ; Ye) ≤ 2neTεTR− 2εT log 2εT . (11)
We will show that if the distribution is sufficiently flat, then
Ye|m is statistically close to a multivariate Gaussian for any
m ∈ MT . Let us assume for now that He is an invertible
square matrix (we next show how to reduce the other cases to
this one). In this case, given a message m, we have
Hex ∼ DHe(ΛTe +λm),
√
(HeH†e)σ2s
.
According to Lemma 1, the distribution of Hex + we is
within variational distance 4εT from the normal distribution
N (0,√Σ0), where εT = εHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) and
Σ0 = (HeH†e)σ2s + σ2eI, Σ−13 = (HeH†e)−1σ−2s + σ−2e I.
(12)
We thus have the following bound for the information
leakage ((11) with εT replaced by 4εT ):
I(M ; Ye) ≤ 8neTεTR− 8εT log 8εT . (13)
Therefore, if εT = εHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) = o(1/T ), the leakage
vanishes as T increases for the specific realization He. To
achieve strong secrecy universally, we must, however, ensure
the existence of a lattice with vanishing flatness factor for
all possible Σ3. We postpone the universality discussion to
Section V where it is proven that a vanishing flatness factor is
possible simultaneously for all He ∈ Se and γHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) <
pi. This condition implies that semantic security is possible for
any VNR,
γHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) =
|H†eHe|1/naTV (ΛTe )1/naT
|Σ3|1/naT < pi, (14)
V (ΛTe )
1/naT <
∣∣I + ρeH†eHe∣∣−1/na piσ2s = (piσ2s)e−Ce/na .
(15)
Number-of-Antenna Mismatch. The above analysis assumed
that ne = na, i.e., the number of eavesdropper receive
antennas is equal to the the number of transmit antennas. Al-
though analytically simpler, this assumption is not reasonable
in practice, since we expect a compound scheme to perform
well for any number of eavesdropper antennas. We show next
how to reduce the other cases to the square case.
(i) ne < na: Recall that the signal received by the eaves-
dropper is given in matrix form by
Ye = HeX + We.
Let H˜e ∈ C(na−ne)×na be a completion of He such that
He =
(
He
βH˜e
)
,
is a full-rank sqaure matrix and β > 0 is some small number.
Let W˜e ∈ C(na−ne)×T be a matrix corresponding to circularly
symmetric Gaussian noise. Consider the following surrogate
MIMO channel:(
Ye
Y˜e
)
=
(
He
βH˜e
)
X +
(
We
W˜e
)
,
where H˜e is scaled so that the capacity of the new channel is
arbitrarily close to the original one. Indeed for any full rank
completion H˜e, from the matrix determinant lemma, we have
|I+ρeH†eHe| = |I+ρeH†eHe|×|I+β2H˜e(|I+ρeH†eHe|)−1H˜†e| ≥ eCe .
(16)
Therefore, by letting β → 0, the left-hand side tends to eCe .
For any signal X, the information leakage of the surrogate
channel is strictly greater than the original one. Indeed, the
the eavesdropper’s original channel is stochastically degraded
with respect to the augmented one, thus I(M ; (Ye, Y˜e)) ≥
7(a) Block diagram of the wiretap coding scheme.
(b) Block diagram of Bob’s receiver, where Fb is the MMSE-GDFE matrix and R
−1
b is the inverse linear operator that maps cosets of
RbΛ
T
b /RbΛ into cosets of Λ
T
b /Λ
T
e .
Fig. 2: Encoding and decoding over the compound wiretap channel.
I(M ; Ye). A universally secure code for the na × na MIMO
compound channel will have vanishing information leakage
for the surrogate na × na channel (for any completion) and
therefore will also be secure for the original ne×na channel.
(ii) ne > na: Performing a rectangular QR factorization of
He we have:
He = Q
(
Rˆ
0
)
,
where Q ∈ Cne×ne and Rˆ ∈ Cna×na are square matrices.
Therefore the eavesdropper’s received signal is equivalent to
Ye = Q
(
Rˆ
0
)
X +
(
W
(1)
e
W
(2)
e
)
⇐⇒ Q†Ye =
(
Rˆ
0
)
X +
(
W˜
(1)
e
W˜
(2)
e
)
,
where the components of the noise matrices W˜(1)e ,W˜
(2)
e are
i.i.d. Gaussian. The leakage is therefore the same as for the
square channel Rˆ and a universal code will also achieve
vanishing leakage for the non-square channel.
C. The Legitimate Channel: Reliability
It was shown in [29] that if X ∼ DΛTb ,σs , then the
maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) decoder for the signal Yb is
equivalent to lattice decoding of FbYb, where Fb is the
MMSE-GDFE matrix to be defined in the sequel. We cannot
claim directly that X ∼ DΛTb ,σs , since the message distribution
in MT need not be uniform. Nonetheless, we show that
reliability is still possible for all individual messages.
The full decoding process is depicted in Figure 2b. Bob first
applies a filtering matrix Fb so that
Y˜b = FbYb = RbX + Wb,eff,
where R†bRb = H
†
bHb + ρ
−1
b I and F
†
bRb = ρ
−1
b Hb, and the
effective noise is
Wb,eff = (FbHb −Rb)X + FbWb.
The next step is to decode Y˜b in RbΛTb , in order to obtain
QRbΛTb (Y˜b), which is then remapped into the element of the
coset RbΛTb /RbΛ
T
e through the operation mod RbΛ
T
e . We can
then invert the linear transformation associated to Rb (notice
that Rb has full rank) in order to obtain the coset in ΛTb /Λ
T
e
and re-map it to the message space MT through φ−1.
In the first step, from Lemma 1, the effective noise Wb,eff
is statistically close to a Gaussian noise with covariance:
Σb,eff = σ
2
s(FbHb −Rb)(FbHb −Rb)† + σ2bFbF†b(17)
= ρ−2b σ
2
sR
−†
b R
−1
b + σ
2
bρ
−2
b R
−†
b H
†
bHbR
−1
b
= σ2bR
−†
b (ρ
−1
b I + H
†
bHb)R
−1
b = σ
2
b I.
provided that ε(FbHb−Rb)ΛTe (Σb,inv) is small, where
Σ−1b,inv = (σ
2
s(FbHb −Rb)(FbHb −Rb)†)−1 + (σ2bFbF†b)−1.
(18)
The probability of error given any message m is thus bounded
by
Perr|m ≤
(
1 + 4ε(FbHb−Rb)ΛTe (Σb,inv)
)
P (W˜b,eff /∈ V(RbΛTb )),
(19)
where each entry of W˜b,eff is i.i.d. normal with variance
σ2b . Therefore, if we guarantee that ε(FbHb−Rb)ΛTe (Σb,inv) is
8bounded and if we choose a universally good lattice, the
probability vanishes for all possible Rb. This is possible [29]
provided that
γRbΛTb (σb) > pie, (20)
namely,
V (ΛTb )
1/naT >
∣∣∣I + ρbH†bHb∣∣∣−1/na pieσ2s = (pieσ2s)e−Cb/na .
(21)
However, the evaluation of Σb,inv is cumbersome and im-
plies an extra condition for the flatness of ΛTe . Next we show,
instead, how to circumvent this problem by using the fact that
that the effective noise is “asymptotically” sub-Gaussian with
covariance matrix σ2b I. We say that a centred random vector
w ∈ Rn is sub-Gaussian with (proxy) parameter σ if
logE[et〈w,u〉] ≤ t
2σ2
2
for all t ∈ R and all unit norm vectors u ∈ Rn.
Lemma 3 ([28]). Let x be a random vector with distribution
DΛTe +λm,σs , and let ε′ = εΛTe (σs) . For any matrix A and
any vector u ∈ CnbT , we have:
E[e<{x†Au}] ≤
(
1 + ε′
1− ε′
)
e
σ2s
4 ‖Au‖2 .
Notice that the average power per dimension of a sub-
Gaussian random variable is always less than or equal to its
parameter σ2s . Moreover, the sum of two sub-Gaussians is also
a sub-Gaussian (for more properties, the reader is referred
to [28]). The above lemma, along with (18), allows us to
establish that Wb,eff is almost sub-Gaussian with parameter
σ2b . Therefore, as long as ε
′ ≈ 0 the probability of error tends
to zero if we choose ΛTb to be universally AWGN-good.
D. Proof of Theorem 1: Achievable Secrecy Rates
From the previous subsections, semantic security is achiev-
able if ΛTb and Λ
T
e satisfy:
1) Reliability (20): γRbΛTb (σb) > pie
2) Secrecy (14): γHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) < pi
3) Sub-Gaussianity of equivalent noise and power con-
straint: εΛTe (σs)→ 0.
From and (21), the first two conditions can be satisfied for
rates up to
log |I + ρbH†bHb| − log |I + ρeH†eHe| − na
nats per channel use, but the last conditions may, a priori, limit
these rates to certain SNR regimes. Fortunately, if condition
2) is satisfied, we automatically satisfy the condition for
εΛTe (σs)→ 0, since
V (ΛTe )
1/naT
σ2s
≤ V (Λ
T
e )
1/naT
e−Ce/naσ2s
< pi.
Therefore, if (ΛTb ,Λ
T
e ) is a sequence of nested lattices, where
1) ΛTb is universally good for the compound channel with
set Sb,
2) ΛTe is universally secure for the compound channel with
set Se,
then nested lattice Gaussian coding achieves any secrecy rate
up to
R ≤ (Cb − Ce − na)+.
The existence of such nested pairs is proved subsequently
in Section V and Appendix B, which concludes the proof of
Theorem 1.
In fact using a method in [40] we can further reduce the gap
to approximately na log(e/2). We conjecture that this gap can
be completely removed with tighter bounds for the variational
distance between the discrete and continuous Gaussians. This
is left as an open question.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 is also a slight improvement on the
main result of [11, Theormm 5] in the sense that one of the
conditions on the SNR of Bob (ρb > e) is not needed any
longer. Indeed, for the Gaussian channel, na = 1 and the
SNR condition for non-zero secrecy rates is Cb > Ce + 1,
which is equivalent to
1 + ρb
1 + ρe
> e.
V. UNIVERSALLY FLAT GAUSSIANS
The results in the previous section require the existence
of sequences of lattices which are universally good for the
wiretap channel. More specifically, we need a sequence ΛTb
which is universally AWGN-good and a sequence ΛTe whose
leakage vanishes for all channel realizations of the eavesdrop-
per. The first condition was studied in [29], where it was
shown, through a compactness argument, that random lattices
are universal. In this section we deal with the second condition
and prove the existence of lattices ΛTe which are universally
good for secrecy of the MIMO channel.
Two methods are provided to establish the main result. The
first method relies solely on random lattice coding arguments
and achieves secrecy capacity up to a gap of na nats per
channel use. The second method is based on algebraic reduc-
tions and exhibits a larger gap (by a factor of ω(na log na))
to capacity, but has the appealing property of reducing the
problem to the one of constructing secrecy-good lattices for the
AWGN channel, making it potentially more useful in practice.
A. Construction A
Construction A (or “mod-p”) lattices are certainly the sim-
plest choice for constructing pairs of nested lattices, however
generalizations based on algebraic lattices may offer greater
flexibility in the code design, which could be leveraged to ob-
tain better decoding complexity, diversity, or other parameters.
Moreover, the coding scheme in Section V-C entails an extra
condition on the ensemble, which can be satisfied by assuming
an algebraic structure. A general “flexible” construction can be
defined via “generalized reductions”. Let ψ : Λbase → FTp be a
surjective homomorphism from a base lattice Λbase of complex
dimension N ≥ T to the vector space FTp (also referred to as
a reduction). Define the lattice Λ(C) as the pre-image of a
linear code C,
Λ(C) = ψ−1(C).
9If C has length T and dimension k, the volume of Λ(C) equals
to pT−kV (Λbase). For instance if N = T , Λbase = Z[i]T the
mapping ψ is the reduction modulo p:
ψ(a1 + b1i, a2 + b2i, . . . , aT + bT i) =
(a1 (mod p), b1 (mod p), a2 (mod p), b2 (mod p), · · · ,
aT (mod p), bT (mod p)),
(22)
we recover an analogue of Loeliger’s (mod-p) Construction A
[41]. In this case we obtain a nested lattice beween Z[i]T and
pZ[i]T . More refined “direct” constructions can be obtained by
using number theory and prime ideals of Z[i]. For instance, if
Λbase is the embedding of the ring of integers of a number field
and ψ is the reduction modulo a prime ideal we can recover
the constructions in [29]. Notice that, for this construction, if
C1 ⊂ C2, we obtain two nested lattices Λ(C1) ⊂ Λ(C2).
It was shown in [42] that if {ψ} is an infinite sequence
of mappings, under mild conditions2 the ensemble of lattices
averaged over all linear codes C of same dimension k satisfies
the Minkowski-Hlawka theorem, namely:
lim
p→∞EC
 ∑
x∈βΛ(C)\{0}
f(x)
 = V −1 ∫
CN
f(x),
where β = V 1/2N (pT−kV (Λ))1/2N is a constant so that all
lattices have volume V . The result holds for any integrable
function f which decays sufficiently fast (in particular any
function upper bounded by a constant times 1/(‖x‖+1)2N+δ
for some δ > 0). Clearly the Gaussian probability density
function satisfies this restriction.
B. Lattices Which Are Good for Secrecy
In what follows we will apply the generalized version of
Construction A to construct a sequence of lattices ΛTe which
is good for secrecy, i.e., which has vanishing flatness factor for
all eavesdropper channel realizations. As usual, T will denote
the blocklength (cf. Equation (1)), N will be set to naT (the
complex dimension of the coding lattice) and k < T is any
positive integer.
Using the above Minkowski-Hlawka theorem, there exists
an ensemble of lattices L of volume V such that
EL
 ∑
x∈Λ\{0}
f(x)
 ≤ V −1 ∫
CnaT
f(x)dx + ε, (23)
for any ε > 0 . Equation (23) implies that
EL
 ∑
x∈Λ\{0}
e−x
†Σ−1x
 ≤ V −1pinaT |Σ|+ ε,
therefore
EL
[
εΛ(
√
Σ)
]
≤ V (1 + ε)
pinaT |Σ| .
Hence as long as ε is bounded and V 1/T /pi|Σ|1/T is bounded
by a constant less than 1, the flatness factor tends to zero
2More specifically, it is required that that the sequence of lattices corre-
sponding to the kernels of ψ has a non-vanishing Hermite parameter.
exponentially in the proposed lattice coding scheme. The
condition for ε can be achieved, for instance, by choosing
p sufficiently large in Construction A.
Lemma 4 (Universally Flat Lattice Gaussians). Let He =
He⊗I and Σ−13 = (HeH†e)−1σ−2s +σ−2e I, as in Equation (12).
For any γ < pi, there exists a sequence of lattices ΛTe ⊂ CnaT
with γHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) ≤ γ and universally vanishing flatness
factor, i.e.,
lim
T→∞
εHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) = 0 for all He ∈ Se.
Moreover, the convergence rate is exponential, i.e., for all
He ∈ Se, εHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) = e
−Ω(T ).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the quantization argument for
the probability of error in [29], which, in turn follows [36].
(i) Fixed He. If L is a Minkowski-Hlawka ensemble with
volume V , then
EL
[
εHeΛ(T )(Σ3)
] ≤ (1 + ε)(γHeΛ(T )(√Σ3)
pi
)naT
which guarantees a sequence Λ(T )e (at this point, possibly
depending on He) with vanishing flatness factor as long as
γ < pi.
(ii) Finite set. Let SQ ⊂ Se be a finite subset of Se with
cardinality Q. We have
EL
[
max
He∈SQ
εHeΛ(T )e (Σ3)
]
≤ EL
 ∑
He∈SQ
εHeΛ(T )e (Σ3)

= Q(1 + ε)
(
γHeΛ(T )e (
√
Σ3)
pi
)naT
→ 0
which guarantees a sequence Λ(T )e with exponentially vanish-
ing flatness factor for any He ∈ Se.
(iii) Quantization step. By quantizing the channel space,
we can extend step (ii) into a universal code for any channel
in Se. This analysis is described in Appendix A. Here we
provide a sketch of the argument. Suppose SQ is a δ-covering
for Se, i.e., for all He ∈ Se, there exists Hq ∈ SQ such
that ‖He −Hq‖ ≤ δ. From the compactness of Se, such
a covering exists for any arbitrarily small δ > 0, and the
size of the covering depends only on na, which is fixed for
the whole transmission. Furthermore, the theta series is a
continuous function of He, which implies that the flatness
factor in different channel realizations are also close. From
this, we can choose δ independently of T that guarantees that
the total exponent is negative. Therefore, the flatness factor
tends to zero uniformly as T →∞.
The above proof does not rely on a specific realization
but rather on the knowledge of the compact compound set
Se. It is reminiscent of a widely used technique in coding
for compound channels (e.g., [36]). Essentially, an encoder
develops a code for Qδ channels, where Qδ is the cardinality
of a good quantizer of the channel space. However the
quantization Qδ may increase the effective blocklength for a
target information leakage. Moreover, the proof does not give
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us insights on how to effectively quantize Se, making algebraic
approaches appealing in practice.
Lemma 4 shows the existence of universally flat Gaussians
or, in other words, the existence of a sequence of lattices ΛTe
which are good for secrecy. Recall that in our construction
IV-A, we required ΛTe to be nested with Λ
T
b ⊃ ΛTe , where
ΛTb is a sequence of lattices which are good for the legitimate
compound channel. The existence of ΛTb was proven in [29].
In Appendix B we argue that both conditions can be achieved
by a nested pair (ΛTb ,Λ
T
e ) which is the last missing part of
the proof of Theorem 1.
C. Algebraic Approach
Following [33], we now define a lattice admitting algebraic
reduction.
Definition 6 (EU Decomposition). We say that Λ admits
algebraic reduction if for any unit determinant matrix A ∈
Cna×na there exists a matrix decomposition of the form
A = EU, where E and U are also unit-determinant satisfying
the following properties:
1) UΛ = Λ,
2)
∥∥E−1∥∥
F
≤ α for some absolute constant α that does
not depend on A.
The Golden Code is one example of a lattice that admits
algebraic reduction [33]. Lattices built from generalized ver-
sions of Construction A based on number fields and division
algebras also admit a similar reduction (if necessary we
may relax requirement 1) to include equivalence instead of
equality). This property was used in [29] to achieve capacity
of the infinite compound MIMO channel. Note that α grows
with na. See [29, Theorem 3] for an upper bound on α in
the case of number fields, and [33] in the case of division
algebras. Next, we show that an ensemble of lattices satisfying
Definition 6 achieves the secrecy capacity of the compound
MIMO channel up to a constant gap.
Recall the following relation between the spectral norm and
the Frobenius norm:
‖I⊗A‖ = ‖A‖ ≤ ‖A‖F ,
for the identity matrix I of any dimension.
Lemma 5. Suppose that Λ ⊂ CnaT is such that its dual lattice
Λ∗ admits algebraic reduction. Then for A ∈ Cna×na ,
εΛ(
√
IT ⊗A) ≤ εΛ
(
|A|1/2na/α
)
.
Proof. From the Poisson summation formula and the expres-
sion for the flatness factor (9):
εΛ(
√
IT ⊗A) =
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e−pi
2λ†(IT⊗A)λ
=
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e−pi
2‖√IT⊗Aλ‖2
=
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e
−pi2|A|1/na
∥∥∥∥∥∥
√
IT⊗A
(
√
|A|)
1/na
λ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
(24)
Upon decomposing
√
A(√
|A|
)1/na = EU as in Definition 6,
the last equation becomes∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e−pi
2|A|1/na‖(I⊗E)λ‖2 (a)≤
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e
−pi2|A|1/na ‖λ‖2‖E−1‖2
(b)
≤
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e
−pi2|A|1/na ‖λ‖2‖E−1‖2F
(c)
≤
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e−pi
2|A|1/na ‖λ‖2
α2
= εΛ
(
|A|1/2na/α
)
,
(25)
where (a) is due to the bound ‖λ‖ ≤∥∥(I⊗E)−1∥∥ ‖(I⊗E)λ‖ and the fact that ∥∥(I⊗E)−1∥∥ =∥∥(I⊗E−1)∥∥ = ∥∥E−1∥∥, (b) is due to the inequality between
the 2-norm and the Frobenius norm and (c) follows from
Definition 6.
Since
εHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) = εΛTe (
√
Σ),
where Σ−1 = H†eΣ−13 He and Σ−13 = (HeH†e)−1σ−2s + σ−2e I
is block-diagonal, we can apply the above lemma. Therefore, if
we construct an ensemble of lattices such that their duals admit
algebraic reduction for some constant α > 0, then there exist
lattices with vanishing flatness factor εHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) provided
that
εΛTe
(√
σ2sα
−2e−Ce/na
)
→ 0. (26)
This can be achieved if:
V (ΛTe )
1/naT < pie−Ce/naα−2σ2s . (27)
Notice that the right-hand side of (27) depends only on the
determinant of Σ3 or on the capacity of the eavesdropper
channel, not on any individual realization. For this condition
to hold, we only need a sequence of secrecy-good lattices for
a surrogate eavesdropper channel with smaller noise variance
(by a factor α−2). Therefore, by combining (21) and (27), we
arrive at the the following result:
Theorem 2. Let (ΛTb ,ΛTe ) be a sequence of nested lattices
where: (i) ΛTb is universally good for the compound MIMO
channel and (ii) ΛTe satisfies Definition 6 and is secrecy good
for the AWGN channel (Condition (26)). Then nested lattice
Gaussian coding achieves any secrecy rate up to
R ≤ (Cb − Ce − na − 2na log(α))+.
Notice that the gap has a different nature than the one in
the previous subsection. It consists of two parts: na due to the
same restriction on the flatness factor in Theorem 1, and logα
due to algebraic reduction. Although we have conjectured that
the gap in Theorem 1 can be essentially removed, this is not
the case for logα in Theorem 2. Indeed, since α cannot be
smaller than
√
na [29, Theorem 3], this gap is always larger
than na log na. However, the code construction can be reduced
to the problem of finding good lattices for the Gaussian wiretap
channel (with some additional algebraic structure), making the
design potentially more practical.
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Notice also that this strategy is closely related to the
“decoupled design” for compound MIMO channels [29, Sect.
VI]. Both strategies can indeed be combined, i.e., Bob’s code
can also benefit from algebraic reduction. In this case both the
original channel decoder and the code design can be greatly
simplified, at the cost of an extra gap (i.e.,, an extra factor
2na log(α)) to the compound capacity.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have presented a construction of nested
lattice codes to achieve the secrecy capacity of compound
MIMO wiretap channels, up to a gap equal to the number of
transmit antennas. Compared to [28], the construction in this
work is not only more practical, but also enjoys a smaller gap.
With algebraic reduction, further simplification has been made,
at the cost of an extra gap to the secrecy capacity. Interestingly,
the algebraic approach reaffirms the important role of the dual
lattice of ΛTe in wiretap channels, firstly discovered in [28].
a) Encoding and decoding: Encoding and decoding are
not much different from those of lattice codes for compound
MIMO channels in [29]. The generalized Construction A
employed in this paper may be viewed as a concatenated code,
where the inner code is a lattice with some desired properties,
while the outer code is an error correction code. Therefore,
decoding can be run successively, which greatly reduces the
decoding complexity. As for encoding, the discrete Gaussian
shaping can be facilitated by choosing a nice base lattice, e.g.,
a rotated Zna lattice whose Gaussian shaping is easy. There are
highly efficient algorithms for Gaussian shaping over specific
lattices [43], but more research is needed for Gaussian shaping
over generalized Construction A. Practical implementation of
the proposed codes is left as future work.
b) Comparison to other compound models: When the
channel Hb is known and the eavesdropper channel has
bounded norm, [20] has shown that the eavesdropper’s worst
channel is also isotropic. In this case the capacity can be
achieved by decomposing the channels into different inde-
pendent substreams with appropriate power, and applying
independent coding for the Gaussian channel. This is also
the case when Hb has a linear uncertainty. In these cases,
a combination of correct power allocation and a similar
argument to Lemma 4 shows that semantic secrecy is also
achievable by random lattice codes. On the other hand, the
algebraic approach (Theorem 2) heavily relies on the fact
that the channels in Se have the same white-input mutual
information.
c) Finite-length performance: The results of this work
are based on asymptotic analysis as T → ∞. The practical
performance of the proposed universal codes at finite block
lengths warrants an investigation. In particular, how large T is
required to approach the promised gap in practice? For given
T , how far do practical codes perform from secrecy capacity?
It may be a challenging problem to design good, practical
universal codes.
As a further perspective, one may consider an “outage”
analysis of the MIMO wiretap channel in a finite blocklength
regime, where the channel matrices Hb and He may be
random. In other words, one may analyze the probability that
the code rate R exceeds the secrecy capacity. In such scenarios,
we believe that lattices with the non-vanishing determinant
property will be able to provide universal bounds for the
outage probability. We leave it as an open problem.
APPENDIX A
QUANTIZATION OF CHANNEL SPACE
In this appendix we show bounds on the flatness factor in
the quantized channel space, formalizing part (iii) in the proof
of Lemma 4. Instead of performing the quantization directly in
the eavesdropper space Sb, we will consider the corresponding
covariance matrices. Following the notation of Lemma 4, we
have:
εHeΛTe (
√
Σ3) = εΛTe (
√
Σ),
where Σ−1 = H†eΣ−13 He and Σ−13 = (HeH†e)−1σ−2s +σ−2e I.
Let Ωe be the space of co-variance matrices of the form Σ,
where He can be any matrix in the space of eavesdropper
matrices Sb:
Ωe =
{
Σ = (H†eΣ−13 He)−1 : He = IT ⊗He,He ∈ Se
}
.
By using the definition of the flatness factor, we can show the
following:
Lemma 6. Let Σ, Σ¯ ∈ Ωe be two matrices satisfying∥∥Σ−Σ∥∥ ≤ δ. If δ is sufficiently small, then Σ−δI is positive-
definite and
εΛTe (
√
Σ) ≤ εΛTe (
√
Σ− δI).
Proof. For any λ ∈ CnaT we have |λ†(Σ−Σ)λ| ≤ ‖λ‖2 δ.
Therefore
εΛTe (
√
Σ) =
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e−pi
2λ†Σλ
=
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
e−pi
2λ†(Σ−Σ)λe−pi
2λ†Σλ
≤
∑
λ∈Λ∗\{0}
epi
2δλ†λe−pi
2λ†Σλ = εΛTe (
√
Σ− δI).
Suppose now that Sδ is a δ-quantizer for Ωe with cardinality
Qδ , i.e., for all Σ there exists Σ ∈ Sδ such that
∥∥Σ−Σ∥∥ ≤ δ.
For any Σ we have:
E[εΛTe (
√
Σ)] ≤ E[εΛTe (
√
Σ− δI)] ≤ E[max
Σ∈Sδ
εΛTe (
√
Σ− δI)]
≤ E[
∑
Σ∈Sδ
εΛTe (
√
Σ− δI)]
≤ Qδ(1 + εT )
(
γΛTe (
√
Σ− δI)
pi
)naT
= Qδ(1 + εT )f(δ)
(
γΛTe (
√
Σ)
pi
)naT
,
where
f(δ) =
|Σ|
|Σ− δI| =
1
|I− δΣ−1| .
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The last upper bound is universal, in the sense that it does
not depend on the specific realization He. Note that if the VNR
condition is satisfied, namely γΛTe (
√
Σ) < pi, then the term
(γΛTe (
√
Σ)/pi)naT decays exponentially in T with exponent
given by
c1 = −na log(γΛTe (
√
Σ)/pi).
From this, we obtain the bound
E[εΛTe (
√
Σ)] ≤ (1 + εT )Qδe−T(c1−
log f(δ)
T )
= (1 + εT )Qδe
−T(c1−log |I−δ(σ−2e H†eHe+σ−2s I)|),
(28)
which holds for any Σ ∈ Ωe. We can therefore choose a
small δ (independently of T ) such that the total exponent is
negative. Since Qδ does not depend on T , and εT can be
made arbitrarily small, we obtain an exponential decay of the
flatness factor.
APPENDIX B
SIMULTANEOUS GOODNESS
From Section V, the construction of universally secure
codes boils down to finding a sequence of pairs of nested
lattices ΛTb ⊂ ΛTe such that
• ΛTb has vanishing probability of error: PΛb(Rb) ,
P(W˜b,eff /∈ V(RbΛTb ))→ 0 as T →∞;
• ΛTe has vanishing flatness factor: εΛTe (
√
Σ)→ 0 as T →
∞,
where we recall that W˜b,eff is the effective noise, sub-Gaussian
with co-variance matrix σ2b I, R
†
bRb = H
†
bHb + ρ
−1
b I, and
Σ−1 = H†eΣ−13 He,with Σ−13 = (HeH†e)−1σ−2s + σ−2e I.
First suppose that Rb and Σ are fixed. Let ΛTb = Λ(Cb) be
obtained by choosing Cb uniformly in the set of all codes
with parameters (T, kb, p). Let ΛTe = Λ(Ce) be obtained by
expurgating kb − ke columns from Cb. With this process Ce
will be also chosen uniformly from all (T, ke, p) codes. We
have:
ECb [max
{
PΛTb (Rb), εΛTe (
√
Σ)
}
]
≤ ECb [PΛTb (Rb) + εΛTe (
√
Σ)]
= ECb [PΛTb (Rb)] + ECe [εΛTe (
√
Σ)]→ 0.
(29)
Convergence of both terms in the last equation is guaranteed
to be exponentially fast. Indeed:
• The term ECb [PΛTb (Rb)] tends to zero exponentially pro-
vided that γRb(Λb) > pie, due to AWGN-goodness of
ΛTb .
• The term ECe [εΛTe (
√
Σ)] tends to zero exponentially
provided that γΛTe (
√
Σ) → 0, due to Appendix A,
Equation (28).
Furthermore, by considering the quantized channel spaces,
similarly to Appendix A, we conclude that the convergence
is universal. Therefore, there exists a pair of lattices ΛTb ,Λ
T
e
where ΛTb is universally AWGN-good and Λ
T
e is universally
secrecy-good, and Theorem 1 follows.
Remark 2. Although the above argument only demonstrates
the existence of a pair of good lattices, it is possible to show
a concentration result on the performance of the ensemble of
nested lattices. Suppose some exponential bound e−cT on (29)
for some c > 0. Then, using Markov’s inequality, we have that
for the ensemble of nested lattices considered,
P(PΛTb (Rb)+εΛTe (
√
Σ) > e−(c−c
′)T ) < e−c
′T , ∀ 0 < c′ < c.
(30)
That is, with probability higher than 1−e−c′T over the choice
of Cb, (29) stays below e−(c−c′)T . In other words, most of
these nested lattices have a performance concentrating around
e−cT .
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Laura Luzzi and Roope
Vehkalahti for helpful discussions.
REFERENCES
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal,
vol. 54, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[2] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Wire-
less information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54,
no. 6, pp. 2515–2534, June 2008.
[3] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical Layer Security: From Information
Theory to Security Engineering. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[4] Y. Liang, H. Poor, and S. Shamai, Information Theoretic Security.
Foundations and Trends in Communications and Information Theory,
Now Publishers, 2009.
[5] H. Mahdavifar and A. Vardy, “Achieving the secrecy capacity of wiretap
channels using polar codes,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 10,
pp. 6428–6443, Oct. 2011.
[6] T. C. Gulcu and A. Barg, “Achieving secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel and broadcast channel with a confidential component,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 1311–1324, Feb. 2017.
[7] Y.-P. Wei and S. Ulukus, “Polar coding for the general wiretap channel,”
in Proc. 2015 IEEE Inform. Theory Workshop, Jerusalem, Israel, April
2015, pp. 1–5.
[8] H. Tyagi and A. Vardy, “Universal hashing for information-theoretic
security,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 103, no. 10, pp. 1781–1795, Oct. 2015.
[9] M. Bellare, S. Tessaro, and A. Vardy, “Semantic security for the wiretap
channel,” in Proc. CRYPTO 2012, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 7417. Springer-Verlag, pp. 294–311.
[10] F. Oggier, P. Sole´, and J.-C. Belfiore, “Lattice codes for the wiretap
Gaussian channel: Construction and analysis,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 62, no. 10, pp. 5690–5708, Oct. 2016.
[11] C. Ling, L. Luzzi, J.-C. Belfiore, and D. Stehle´, “Semantically secure
lattice codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 60, no. 10, pp. 6399–6416, Oct. 2014.
[12] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless chan-
nels,” in 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory,
July 2006, pp. 356–360.
[13] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secrecy capacity region of
fading broadcast channels,” in 2007 IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory, June 2007, pp. 1291–1295.
[14] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972, Aug.
2011.
[15] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas–Part II: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov. 2010.
[16] T. Liu and S. Shamai, “A note on the secrecy capacity of the multiple-
antenna wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 55, no. 6, pp.
2547–2553, June 2009.
[17] S. Loyka and C. D. Charalambous, “Optimal signaling for secure
communications over Gaussian MIMO wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 12, pp. 7207–7215, Dec. 2016.
[18] A. Khina, Y. Kochman, and A. Khisti, “The MIMO wiretap channel
decomposed,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 1046–1063,
Feb. 2018.
13
[19] X. He and A. Yener, “MIMO wiretap channels with unknown and
varying eavesdropper channel states,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60,
no. 11, pp. 6844–6869, Nov. 2014.
[20] R. F. Schaefer and S. Loyka, “The secrecy capacity of compound
Gaussian MIMO wiretap channels,” IEEE Tran. Inf. Theory, vol. 61,
no. 10, pp. 5535–5552, 2015.
[21] Y. Liang, G. Kramer, H. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Compound wiretap chan-
nels,” Eurasip Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking,
vol. 2009, 2009.
[22] I. Bjelakovic´, H. Boche, and J. Sommerfeld, “Secrecy results for
compound wiretap channels,” Problems of Information Transmission,
vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 73–98, 2013.
[23] A. Khisti, “Interference alignment for the multiantenna compound
wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 2976–
2993, May 2011.
[24] J.-C. Belfiore and F. Oggier, “An error probability approach to MIMO
wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3396–3403,
August 2013.
[25] D. Karpuk, A.-M. Ernvall-Hyto¨nen, C. Hollanti, and E. Viterbo, “Prob-
ability estimates for fading and wiretap channels from ideal class Zeta
functions,” Advances in Mathematics of Communication, vol. 9, no. 4,
pp. 391–413, 2015.
[26] W. Kositwattanarerk, S. S. Ong, and F. Oggier, “Construction a of lattices
over number fields and block fading (wiretap) coding,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 2273–2282, May 2015.
[27] H. Mirghasemi and J.-C. Belfiore, “Lattice code design criterion for
MIMO wiretap channels,” in IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW),
2015.
[28] L. Luzzi, R. Vehkalahti, and C. Ling, “Almost universal codes for MIMO
wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 11, pp. 7218–
7241, Nov 2018.
[29] A. Campello, C. Ling, and J.-C. Belfiore, “Universal lattice codes for
MIMO channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 12, pp. 7847–
7865, Dec 2018.
[30] W. L. Root and P. P. Varaiya, “Capacity of classes of Gaussian channels,”
SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 1350–1393,
1968.
[31] S. Loyka and C. D. Charalambous, “A general formula for compound
channel capacity,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3971–
3991, July 2016.
[32] G. Rekaya, J.-C. Belfiore, and E. Viterbo, “A very efficient lattice
reduction tool on fast fading channels,” in Proceedings of the Internation
Symposium on Information Theory and its Applications (ISITA), Parma,
Italy, 2004.
[33] L. Luzzi, G. R.-B. Othman, and J.-C. Belfiore, “Algebraic reduction for
the Golden code,” Advances in Mathematics of Communications, vol. 6,
no. 1, pp. 1–26, 2012.
[34] C. Ling, “Achieving capacity and security in wireless communications
with lattice codes,” in 2016 9th International Symposium on Turbo Codes
and Iterative Information Processing (ISTC), Sept. 2016, pp. 171–175.
[35] A. Campello, C. Ling, and J.-C. Belfiore, “Semantically secure lattice
codes for compound MIMO channels,” in 2018 International Zurich
Seminar on Information and Communication (IZS), Feb. 2018, pp. 171–
175.
[36] J. Shi and R. Wesel, “A study on universal codes with finite block
lengths,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 53, no. 9, pp. 3066–3074, Sept.
2007.
[37] H. El Gamal, G. Caire, and M. Damen, “Lattice coding and decoding
achieve the optimal diversity-multiplexing tradeoff of MIMO channels,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 968–985, June 2004.
[38] O. Ordentlich and U. Erez, “Precoded integer-forcing universally
achieves the MIMO capacity to within a constant gap,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 323–340, Jan. 2015.
[39] D. Micciancio and O. Regev, “Worst-case to average-case reductions
based on Gaussian measures,” SIAM J. Comput., vol. 37, no. 1, pp.
267–302, Apr. 2007.
[40] H. Mirghasemi and J.-C. Belfiore, “The semantic secrecy rate of the
lattice Gaussian coding for the Gaussian wiretap channel,” in 2014 IEEE
Information Theory Workshop (ITW 2014), Nov 2014, pp. 112–116.
[41] H.-A. Loeliger, “Averaging bounds for lattices and linear codes,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 1767–1773, Nov. 1997.
[42] A. Campello, “Random ensembles of lattices from generalized reduc-
tions,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 7, pp. 5231–5239, July
2018.
[43] A. Campello and J.-C. Belfiore, “Sampling algorithms for lattice Gaus-
sian codes,” in 24th International Zurich Seminar on Communications
(IZS), Zurich, Switzerland, March 2016, pp. 165–169.
